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Summary:
The main purpose of this study was to examine analytically the conflicting
issues and causes of conflict between MNCs and host governments and MNCs and
other publics in the six countries (Brazil, India, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore,
and Thailand)
.
Though the nature and intensity of conflict was conceptually the central
focus of our study it was intended to serve as a springboard to examine broader
intra- and inter-organizational practices and behavior of the multinationals.
Data for this study were collected through interviews with senior executives of
124 MNCs and governmental officials and other knowledgeable persons in these six
countries.
Analysis of the data indicates that the ownership or national origin of the
MNC, the expectational differences between MNCs and host governments, and pre-
vailing market conditions were related to the nature and intensity of conflict
between the MNCs and the host governments. Surprisingly, the relative size,
level of technology employed, level of diversification, period of operation in
the host country and some other internal attributes of the MNCs examined were
not found to be significantly related to conflict.

Multinational Corporations and Host Governments' Relationships:
A Comparative Study of Conflict and Conflicting Issues
The Settings: The Socio-Political Contexts
Increased attention recently has been focused on the impact of multinational
corporations on the national economy, employment, balance of payments, security,
national defense, foreign policies, national sovereignty, and social and economic
development plans of the host countries.
This upsurge of concern for the impact of the MNCs can easily be seen from
the numerous inquiries and investigations presently completed or underway. Such
august bodies as the U.S. Senate Finance Committee (1973), the United Nations
(1973), and many professional associations, such as the British-North-American
Research Association, the National Industrial Conference Board and a number of
prestigious universities both here and abroad, have embarked upon issues
relative to the impact of multinational corporations.
The issues raised and intensive dialogues on the subject have augmented
the sensitivity of those outwardly involved. This has resulted in an optimistic
outlook on the one hand and pessimistic overtones on the other hand (Kendall, 1974;
Shaker, 1970). Figure 1 shows the various parties involved in questioning
the impact of the MNCs.
Until recently, studies in the field of International Business and
multinational corporations were concentrated either on macro-level implications
of MNC-functioning (e.g., balance of payments [Business International, 1976],
diffusion of new technologies [Behrman, 1976]), or analyzing in detail the
functioning of some functional units of the organization such as marketing
(Tepstra, 1967), finance (Polk et al. , 1966), personnel (Gonzalez, Negandhi,
1968), etc. Very few systematic attempts have been made to analyze the
(Figure 1 about here)
-
Host Government and
Various Regulating
Agencies
>
Local
Business
Houses
Clientage Groups
in Host Country
Home Government and
Various Regulating
a Agencies
Clientage Groups
in Home Country
(a) Employers Union
(b) Consumers
(c) Suppliers
(d) Distributors
(e) Stockholders
Figure 1 MNCs and their challengers
interaction between MNCs and host governments, and other publics in the
host countries.
A number of assertions have been made by the academicians and businessmen
alike, pinpointing some of the important causes of conflict between the MNCs
and the host governments. It has been argued, for example, that the foreign
private investor, besides being an "outside intruder," upsets the prevailing
status quo in the host country for being:
(a) Larger in size and capital resources (Ball, 1967);
(b) More aggressive in its marketing strategies, and thereby
establishing proportionately higher market shares, than the
comparable local firms (Servan-Schreiber , 1968);
(c) More sophisticated in its management and technological systems
.(Servan-Schreiber, 1968);
(d) More efficient (Maisonrouge, 1974);
(e) More diversified, and hence more visible in the public eye
(Franko, 1976).
Although such contentions intuitively sound reasonable and appealing,
thus far, such observations have not been empirically verified. The study
reported here attempts to do so.
Purpose of the Study •
The main purpose of this study is to examine the conflicting issues and
causes of conflicts between the MNCs and host governments and the various
publics in the host countries. Attempts were made to explore the relationship
between certain important attributes of the MNC and conflicts with the host
government and various other publics.
Research Focus and Conceptual Scheme
Although the study utilized the so-called open-systems perspective pursued
in organization and interorganization theory areas, the process itself is the
reverse of the current thinking (Emery and Trist, 1969; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1969) in these areas. Briefly, an open-system approach highlights the impact
of external environmental factors on the internal attributes of an organization
while in this study, attempts were made to explore the impact of internal
attributes of an organization (MNC) on the external relationships of the focal
organization with the other units of the organization in a given socio-economic
system.
The Conceptual Model
The model postulates that nature and intensity of conflict are a function
of, among other things,
(a) The managerial style (for which U.S., European, and Japanese
ownership of MNCs was substituted as a surrogate),
(b) Industries in which MNCs were operating,
(c) Size of the MNC's subsidiary (measured in terms of number of
employees, capital investment, perception_of the subsidiary's
execut-f^e of the relative size of his firm in a given country ),
(d) Extent of diversification,
(e) Relative market power of MNCs,
(f) Age or years of the MNC's (subsidiary's) operation in the host
country, and
(g) The expectation differences between MNC and host government toward
each other.
On the host country side, such attributes as relative political stability
and extent of diversity among influential political parties in the country,
level of economic and industrial developments, and market and economic
conditions were conceived as important factors affecting MNC-host-country
relationships. The initial model was developed on the basis of content
analyses of (a) 119 cases of conflict between MNCs and host governments and
other publics in the host countries as reported in academic and popular journals,
articles, and books (Negandhi, Fry, and Fry, 1974), (b) the U.S. State Department
study of 143 disputes of American firms operating overseas (U.S. State Department
1974). Figure 2 outlines the initial conceptual model.
This paper explores the impact of some of the important internal attributes
of MNCs on the MNC-host-country relationships. The relationships explored in
this paper are shown in Figure 3.
Sample and Method
The research sample was drawn at random from various listings of U.S.,
European, and Japanese MNCs operating in six developing countries—Brazil, India,
Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and Thailand. These six countries were chosen to
provide diversities in political structures, level of economic and industrial
developments, and varied experience with foreign private investors.
Attempts were made to obtain comparable firms from each category of the
MNC's ownership—American, European, and Japanese. A letter seeking their
participation was sent out to each MNC drawn from the listings. A total of
124 firms agreed to participate in the study. Senior executives of these firms
were interviewed through a structured interview guide prepared in advance (a
copy of this is available from the senior author) . Some of these interviews
were tape-recorded and were later content-analyzed.
(Figures 2 and 3 about here)
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In addition, a number of government officials and officials of the
Chambers of Commerce and other trade and professional organizations in those
countries studied were also interviewed to collect both the background
information on MNC-operations and their own perspectives on the various issues
raised by MNCs' executives.
Table 1 provides a profile of the companies studied. The proportion of
U.S., European, and Japanese MNCs represents approximately the relative
proportion of the MNCs operating overseas.
Although serious attempts were made to obtain a representative sample of
MNCs, no claims are being made concerning the generality of our results to
all MNCs operating in all the countries in the world.
Table 1 About Here
Variables and Measures
Independent Variables
As shown in Figure 3, the MNC's ownership, size, industry group, period of
subsidiary operations, pattern of equity held by the parent firm in an overseas
subsidiary, level of diversification, level of technology used, the extent of
expectational differences between MNCs and host governments were conceived as
independent variables. The nature of conflict was considered as a dependent variabl
Dependent Variable (Conflict)
The nature of conflict was classified into four categories: (a) Value-
level conflict; (b) Negotiational-level conflict; (c) Policy-level conflict;
(d) Operational-level conflict. Operational definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix 1.
Categorization in the above manner enabled us to discriminate between
essentially interface and intra-organizational conflict. The interface
construct is used here to denote conflict and interactions with units in the
aggregate and macro environments. The intra-organizational construct is used
to denote conflict and interactions with units in the task environment. Thus,
value-negotiational conflicts and policy-conflicts were considered to be
interface conflicts and the operational conflict to be an intra-organizational
conflict.
Each case of conflict was content-analyzed by the senior author and two
additional associates on the basis of the operational definition of each type
of conflict, given in Appendix A. Interrater concurrence was of the order
of 0.95.
Research Results
Interviews in the 12A MNCs yielded 102 cases of conflict. Interestingly
enough, of these, only two could be classified as "value-level" conflict.
This finding indicates that there is an increasing tendency on the part of the
parties involved to be pragmatic and business-like and to push other
considerations into the background. As these two value-conflict cases would
accentuate the observed differences, it was decided to omit them for purposes
of statistical analysis.
Ownership and Conflict
Table 2 provides the relationship between the controlling ownership of
the MNC and the level of MNC-environment-unit conflict.
*
As is evident from the table, the U.S. MNCs have more interface conflicts,
while Japanese MNCs have more operational-level conflicts. However, it is
interesting to note that there are no significant differences between the
*For the purpose of brevity, we henceforth refer to MNC-host-government
conflict and conflicts with various publics in the host-country as MNC-
environment-unit conflict.
8American and European corporations. In fact, the majority of the European
MNCs also faced negotiational- and policy-level conflicts just like the U.S.
MNCs, but merely a fraction of them were plagued with operational problems.
In specific terms, the types of interface problems experienced by U.S. and
European MNCs centered around the host governments' requirements for dilution
of equity and management control, reduction or elimination of royalty payments
for technology and know-how, transfer pricing policies, etc. The operational
problems faced by Japanese MNCs were: low morale and employee productivity,
high turnover and absenteeism, interpersonal conflicts between Japanese
expatriate managers and locals. Such operational problems faced by the
Japanese MNCs have been recognized for some time by a number of scholars.
Kobayashi, for example, states that "...(Japanese managers) often neglect
efforts to integrate. .. they often impose upon local employees preconceived
notions of Japanese management, for example, those of permanent employment,
seniority system, or the business philosophy of market share rather than profit
improvement" (Kobayashi, 1976).
Table 2 about here
When the overall data was split by regions a slightly different picture
emerged for Latin America and the Far East. The differences between the MNCs
are not as significant in the Far East as they are in Latin America. For
example, the Japanese multinationals experienced more interface problems in
the Far Eastern countries, than they did in the Latin American countries;
approximately one-half of the problems faced by them in the former region were
at this level as against no interface problems in the latter region. The U.S.
MNCs do seem to have more negotiational problems in the Latin American countries
than European MNCs.
What are the factors that constitute these observed differences across
the two regions? One possible clue is afforded by the relative time period
of involvement of the Japanese, the Europeans, and the Americans in these
two regions. Europeans and Japanese have been relatively "old hands" in
the Far East, just as Americans have been in Latin America. It appears that
relative newcomers would be less apt to get into interface (especially
negotiational) conflicts as they had invested under more recent regulations,
whereas the older MNCs have to confront with the host government's pressures
to conform to the newer regulations which, in practically all cases, attenuate
the privileges accorded earlier to the MNCs. However, as we will see in a
latter section we were unable to sustain statistically such differences between
the older and the newer firms in our sample.
Equity and Conflict
One of the most significant types of the host country's demands, especially
from the developing countries, is the concern for equity participation by
the local nationals in the foreign enterprises. Such demands by the host
countries seem to have resulted in conflicts of the MNCs with the governments.
As shown in Table 3, wholly-owned and majority-owned corporations tend to have
a significantly greater proportion of conflict if compared to MNCs with only
a minority-equity stake. It is emphasized at this stage that minority
participation did not imply complete lack of conflict. Minority-owned companies
still had to contend with other policy demands, such as proportionate employment
of nationals, reduction in royalties, etc. This indicates that fulfilling
one set of the host government's demands does not make the MNC immune to
further other demands.
Table 3 about here
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Industry and Conflict
It is commonly believed that the firms in the resource-based industries
tend to get involved in higher levels of conflict than those in manufacturing
and service. Our findings give some indications of this sort. Table 3
shows that the extractive industries were involved in a larger number of
interface conflicts than the industries producing non-durable goods. However,
the results across the various industries were statistically insignificant.
Technology and Conflict
Of the 56 cases of conflict observed in technologically advanced firms,
77 percent appeared at the interface level. The comparable figures for
intermediate- and low-technology firms were 66 and 53 percent, respectively.
This could be attributed to the fact that the advanced firms were questioned
about their leverage through the monopolistic powers, pricing policies, royalty
payments, etc., while the low technology firms came under scrutiny with respect
to their usefulness (lack of usefulness) and contribution to the host countries'
developments.
MNC's Visibility and Degree of Diversification
.
.
The degree of visibility of the MNCs affects the views of citizens and
government officials in the host countries positively or negatively. A firm
may become visible for any one of the following reasons:
1. Extraordinary contributions to the host country.
2. Use of specialized technologies.
3. Generation of high employment.
11
4. Payment of high wages, and provision of extensive employee training.
5. High level of conflict with the host/home governments.
6. International publicity (e.g., ITT episode in Chile; recent cases
of bribes by Gulf, Lockheed Aircraft, etc.).
7. Long period of operation in the host country.
8. Pervasiveness of end products in daily life.
The last factor, of course, reflects both the degree of diversification
as well as the frequency of use of the end products. Such pervasiveness,
achieved through end-product use, is likely to catch the attention of governmental
decision makers and local business competitors, evoking fears of economic
domination. Similarly, highly diversified firms, such as ITT, may generate
the same fears in the host countries.
In attempting to understand the impact of the degree of product/service
diversification on the MNC's environmental-unit relationships, we compared the
nature of the conflicts experienced by the most diversified and the least
diversified firms. Table 3 shows that the diversified MNCs were confronted with
a larger number of negotiational conflicts in the host countries (almost twice
as many as those not diversified). There were less differences between the most
diversified and the least diversified firms as far as policy-level conflicts
were concerned.
It may be of interest to note that in our sample European MNCs were more
diversified than the American MNCs.
Franko's (1976) study of continental European MNCs confirms this trend.
That is, he found that European MNCs are more diversified overseas than
American MNCs. Our interviews with host-government officials indicated that,
to an extent diversification by the MNCs is conceived as demonstrating their
12
willingness to contribute to the host-countries' needs, rather than as a sign
of their wishing to establish economic domination.
Period of Operation and Conflict
Frequent stories and newspaper headlines about firms such as United Fruit
in Haiti, ITT in Chile and other Latin American countries, International
Petroleum and Cerro de Pasco in Peru, to name a few, lead one to believe that
older, well-established firms might have secured favorable concessions, and,
consequently, attained significant bargaining power over host countries. Also,
at times, their overt behavior suggests that they have not hesitated to use
their powers against host countries. Critics have argued that it is the
persistence of such behavior on the part of the established MNCs which causes
higher levels of conflict between them and the host countries (Bergsten, 1976).
On the other hand, the newer firms presumably may be less prone to conflict as
they have come under recent government regulations.
Our results show that, proportionally, the older firms faced more interface
conflicts, while the newer ones were plagued with a larger number of operational
problems. However, these differences between the older and newer firms were
not statistically significant.
Size and Conflict
It has been argued that MNCs operate on a theme of "bigger is better,"
and that bigness is viewed with hostility by the host governments (Stephenson,
1972). To test such a hypothesis, we explored the relationship between MNC-
size and conflict. MNC-size was operationalized in terms of level of capital
investment, sales volume, size of employee force, and the executive's
perception of his company's size relative to other companies— foreign and local,
in a given country. As indicated in Table 3, level of investment and sales
13
volume does not seem to be significantly associated with level of conflict.
The number of employees seems to have some relationship with the level of
conflict; corporations with a larger work force appeared to have a higher level
of conflict. This might be due to the fact that with a large work force,
the interests of a larger constituency have to be borne in mind; and also,
with host governments being sensitive to employment levels and labor demands,
even small skirmishes with labor easily tend to be escalated into policy- and
negotiational-level conflicts.
Perceptual Size and Conflict
If an executive perceived that his corporation was relatively very big,
possessing a significant amount of leverage, he would be prone to take a
more aggressive stance, which in turn could increase the level of conflict.
Our findings indicate that this association is not as strong as it is generally
made out to be, though the larger corporations (as perceived by their
executives) do tend to get proportionately into higher amounts of interface
conflicts.
Expectational Differences and Conflict
Psychologists, political scientists, and other social scientists concerned
with the study of human behavior, have argued for quite some time that actual
or imaginary differences in expectations between two parties involved in an
interaction are likely to result in a breakdown of communication, and might
generate tension and even conflict between them.
In order to examine whether differences in expectations between MNCs and
host governments led to a breakdown in communication and generated tension
and conflict, we drew up a list of a number of items in regard to which MNCs
and host governments might have differing expectations.*
*Details pertaining to operationalization of this variable are provided
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Governmental policies, documents, newspaper reports, and other information
gathered through personal interviews with the MNCs' executives and government
officials in these countries, provided additional information about their
expectations toward each other.
As one can see from Tables 4, 5, and 6, a wide gap exists between the
expectations of the MNCs and the host governments. Such breakdowns in
understanding of each other have, indeed, created continuous tensions and
conflicts in their relationships.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 about here
In more specific terms, many of the developing countries, in order to
maximize their returns from foreign private investments, have enacted legislation
which requires a majority local equity in foreign enterprises, higher proportion
of local nationals in top positions, increase of exports and foreign exchange
earnings, and reduction of imports of raw material and spare parts.
Such demands by the host countries have, to some extent, constrained the
MNCs to rationalize their world-wide productive capacity. In order to achieve
this goal, MNCs on their part have required that host countries provide them
with efficient infrastructural facilities, reduce bureaucratic controls and
interference in corporate affairs, and provide favorable labor legislation and
more flexible expansion policies.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5, one can see the extent of the differences between
each other's expectations. For example, while the host countries have shown a
strong concern over the displacement of local firms by foreign investors, and
demanded the development of local resources, utilization of local supplies,
increase in research and development activities, and local ownership (equity)
in foreign enterprises, the MNCs seem to have perceived those demands by the
host countries as mere empty rhetoric.
15
Our results, reported in these Tables, also show that the MNCs see
their own importance in terms of providing capital and needed raw materials,
and increasing the quality of goods and services in the host nations.
However, such contributions by the MNCs were considered of little importance
by the host nations. These differences in expectations between the MNCs and
host countries are bound to create tensions and conflicts, and our results
show a strong association between these two variables. In other words, as
shown in Table 3, MNCs with larger expectational differences are more often
involved in negotiational-level conflicts with the host governments than those
with smaller expectational differences.
Our results also indicate that, relatively speaking, a greater number of
U.S. MNCs have had larger expectational differences with the host countries
than the. European and Japanese MNCs (Franko, 1974, pp. 216-217).
Market Power and Conflict
One of the major concerns of the host nations about MNCs is that their
local industries are being displaced by foreign-owned companies. There is
also a genuine fear that the MNCs could become monopolistic powers, beyond
control of national governments. As Behrman has observed, "Although the host
country likes improvement of quality, reduction of prices, increases of wages,
etc., resulting from foreign investment, it may not like to see its domestic
enterprise pushed to the wall" (1974, p. 44)
.
Thus, potentially monopolistic or oligopolistic market powers of the
multinationals which could result in a virtual "takeover" of local enterprises
are actively resisted, not only by the developing, but also the industrially
developed nations. Countries such as Canada, France, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom, have enacted regulations to discourage such behavior on the
16
part of foreign investors. Even the United States, the champion of the
free-enterprise system, has shown concern about the adverse impact of foreign
investments on its domestic enterprises (Safarian and Bell)
.
Despite such widespread concern about the adverse impact of the
multinationals' market domination in the host countries, our study did not
indicate a significant relationship between the MNCs' market share and the
nature of conflict in the host countries. Although a large proportion of the
MNCs studied indicated that their market share was more than 25 percent, their
problems were, in no case, different from those faced by companies whose market
share was minimal. In other words, it appeared that, regardless of market
share, they were equally susceptible to similar issues and problems. Among
the six countries we studied, only in Malaysia, and to some extent in Brazil,
did the MNCs' market share have some impact on the type of problems experienced
with the host government. However the overall relationships between these two
variables was less striking. But this lack of a relationship does not imply
that the developing countries are unconcerned about issues of economic
domination by the multinationals. Historical evidence seems to indicate that
the host countries follow a three-phase pattern in sorting out this issue of
MNC-domination. Initially, the host country makes an assessment of the impact
of foreign direct investment on its economy. This is generally followed by
the imposition of industry-wide controls of the type India, Malaysia, Peru,
and Brazil have, in the recent past, imposed on their petroleum, mining,
petrochemical, and pharmaceutical industries. In the final phase, host
governments seek to attain direct control of the dominating MNCs in a particular
industry through some form of ownership or managerial control. Some of the
advanced industrial countries have already entered the final phase mentioned
above. The U.S., Canada, and West Germany all impose restrictions on the kinds
17
of industries, in which foreign companies can invest (Safarian and Bell).
The U.S. Government, for example, does not permit foreign investment in and
control of its coastal shipping and nuclear-related industries. The U.S.
Government also has not shown much hesitation in using anti-trust legislation
to prevent the formation of giant monopolies. On the other hand, the European
countries and Japan have either directly or indirectly, supported growth or
formation of giant domestic firms in order to combat the influence of the
U.S. MNCs.
Market Orientation of the Firm and Conflict
It is generally believed that MNCs manufacturing exclusively for exports,
are likely to encounter fewer conflicts in the host countries than those whose
products are sold within the host country. The investment regulations of
many developing countries provide differential incentives for different types
of MNCs, depending on the market orientation of the firm. India, for example,
allows majority or up to 100 percent foreign equity holding to those firms
that export 60 percent or more of their production. Similar regulations can
be found in Mexico, Brazil, and the Andean Pact countries. Conversely,
foreign investors manufacturing primarily for the local market are increasingly
being denied 100 percent, or even majority foreign equity holding, as well
as other privileges (priority imports, etc.) that are granted to export-
oriented firms.
Unfortunately, the majority of the firms in our study primarily serviced
local markets and, consequently, we are unable to shed much light on the
differences or similarities in the kinds of problems faced by export and local-
market oriented firms. The few MNCs in our sample that exported the bulk of
their production did not differ from those manufacturing for local markets
with respect to their conflicts in the host countries. But our sample of such
firms was too small to advance any definite conclusions.
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As shown in Table 3, the market conditions (degree of competitiveness)
faced by the MNCs were significantly related to the nature of conflict. The
firm facing seller's market and moderately competitive markets (signifying
to some extent the kind of market domination) encountered a greater number
of negotiational-level conflicts than those facing highly competitive markets.
Discussion and Implications of Results
The assertion that an MNC's attributes, such as size of capital
investment, sophistication of technology, degree of diversification, period
of operation, size of employee force, and sales volume would have a significant
relationship with the level of conflict in the host country, fared poorly
in our empirical findings. Ownership and pattern of equity holding indicated
a substantial relationship with the level of conflict in the contingency-table
analysis; the fact that expectational differences contributed very significantly
to the variation in the dependent variable of conflict, presents some very importar
implications for both the host governments and the multinational corporations. It
was very evident from the data gathered in the field through in-depth interviews
that both the host government's representatives and the MNC's chief executives
had, at best, a most diffuse understanding of what they were expecting of each
other. While most host governments viewed the entry of an MNC as "the panacea
for all economic and social ills," the MNC's decision makers viewed their
entry primarily in terms of, either, entry into a potentially large market
or in terms of global rationalization of their operations. Any socio-economic
benefits that accrued to the host were viewed as purely incidental to their
main goals. In brief, it appears that the host government's expectations are
at the total system/aggregate environmental level , whereas the MNC's
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expectations are concentrated at the subsystem's (f irm' s) /task environment
level . So considered, the gap between expectations is quite evident. The
problem is confounded by the fact that expectations generally remain unvoiced.
We were repeatedly told by the host government's officials that "we expected
more from the MNCs; we expected them to assist the local entrepreneurs,
establish R&D facilities, introduce products relevant to our economy."
When questioned whether they had made these expectations known specifically
to the MNCs concerned, they were evasive. Most MNCs were aware of these
expectations but chose to ignore them under the pretext that "we haven't been
asked to do so." The only time they took note of the host country's demands
was when the host governments passed regulations to meet their expectation.
It seems ironic that such notice should be taken by the parties concerned
only after the relationships have deteriorated. Clarity of expectations should
go a long way toward reducing tension and conflict.
It was interesting to observe how the U.S. , European, and Japanese
multinationals handled their conflict. The differences in handling probably
accounted for the significance of the relationship between the MNC's ownership
and the conflict. A content analysis of field interviews indicated that most
American MNCs' executives tended to view regulations imposed by the host
governments with ideological overtones. As a result, they took a rather
belligerent, outspoken stance, undeterred of any embarrassment to the parties
involved. The net result of such a behavioral mode means that the conflict
tends to escalate to the higher levels. In contrast, Europeans and
Japanese—the Japanese especially—maintained a very low profile during
periods of stress and conflict. The Japanese in particular displayed a strong
propensity to underplay any conflict or regulations. Rather than go public
like the Americans did, they adopted a very diplomatic stance and attempted to
20
deal with their conflict through influencing the host government's officials.
Also, the American MNCs ' executives, after their initial flurry of activity
against the imposition of regulations, settled down to follow regulation
to the "legal perfection." In contrast, European and Japanese MNCs generally
seemed to interpret quickly and accurately and therefore they acted more in
accordance with the "spirit of the regulation."
The basic difference between the two extreme behavioral modes—the
American and the Japanese—appears to be the multinational's orientation toward
its environment. The American multinationals apparently desire to treat the
macro and aggregate environments as parameters. Thus, policy changes are interpret!
in legalistic mode. In contrast, the Japanese management philosophy and their
behavioral mode appear to lay maximum stress on adapting and acting discreetly
on the aggregate and macro environment, and confining the conflict within the
task environment. The European MNCs' mode currently seems to lie somewhere
between these two extremes.
In conclusion, it may be noted that a number of questions pertaining to
conflict still remain unanswered. This suggests that better predictors of
conflict other than the set of internal attributes that we have considered
probably exist. Variables such as the host country's degree of political and
economic ideology of significant constituents, could be fruitful variables for
future research. The firm's management orientation or philosophy and its
strategy may also prove fruitful avenues for exploration.
APPENDIX A
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
Pattern of Equity
(a) An MNC-subsidiary was considered to be majority-owned if
equity holding by parent exceeded 50%.
(b) An MNC-subsidiary was considered to be minority-owned if
equity holding by parent was less than 50%.
II. Industry Groups
Industries were categorized into four groups:
(1) Extractive—comprising units in petroleum and mining,
(2) Chemical and pharmaceutical—comprising units in petrochemicals,
drugs, synthetics, etc.,
(3) Consumer durables—comprising units in manufacturing,
fabrication, auto, tires, etc.
,
(4) Consumer nondurables—comprising units in agribusiness,
cosmetics, textiles, etc.
III. Size
Companies were classified into four categories:
(a) Basis of their investment as follows:
Category 1. Greater than $3 million
Category 2. $2.99 million to $2 million
Category 3. $1.99 million to $500,000
Category A. Less than $500,000
(b) Companies were classified into three categories on the basis
of their sales volume:
Category 1. More than $5 million
Category 2. $4.99 million to $2 million
Category 3. Less than $2 million
(c) Companies were classified into four categories on the
basis of their employee force:
Category 1. More than 1,000 employees
Category 2. 999 to 400 employees
Category 3. 399 to 100 employees
Category 4. Less than 100 employees
IV. Period of Operation
Companies were categorized into four groups:
Category 1. Operating for more than 15 years
Category 2. Operating between 6 and 14 years
Category 3. Operating less than 6 years.
V. Level of Technology Utilized
Executives were asked to rate the nature of technology utilized
in their operations in relative terms in one of the following
categories. They were asked to take into consideration the level
of technological and industrial developments in a given country
for rating technology utilized by the firm.
Category 1. Advanced/sophisticated technology
Category 2. Intermediate technology
Category 3. Low technology
VI. Level of Diversification
Companies were classified into:
Category 1. Highly diversified— if they offered more than
five distinct products/services
Category 2. Intermediate diversification— if they offered
between two and five distinct products/services
Category 1. Low diversif ication--if they offered less than
two distinct products/services
VII. Market Power
On the basis of market share, a company was classified into:
(1) High dominance—market share exceeded 60%,
(2) Intermediate dominance—market share between 26 - 59%,
(3) Low dominance—market share less than 26%.
VIII. Market Conditions
A company was considered to be in:
(1) Seller's market if
(low competition)
- there were few products competing as substitutes,
- all output of the firm could be easily absorbed
by the market,
- the company had a substantial backlog of orders
for extended periods of time.
(2) Moderately competitive market if
- some competing and substitute products were
available,
- not too much difficulty was experienced in
disposing of company products,
- the backlog of orders was minimal and did not
extend for substantial periods of time.
(3) Highly competitive market if
- a large number of competing and substitute
products existed,
- significant effort had to be made to sell
company products,
- no backlog of orders existed and company had
to make intense efforts to acquire orders
IX. Expectation,! L Differences
(a) A number of host government representatives were asked to
indicate the strength of their government's expectation. A
nine-point Likert-type scale was used for this purpose.12 5 9_
T „. , The mean score of these executives'Low High
ratings was then computed.
(b) The score on the MNC-executives' evaluation of the strength
of each host government's expectation was obtained.
(c) The absolute value of the difference between the executives'
evaluation of strength of each expectation and host government's
assessment of the same was then computed.
(d) The mean score for U.S., European, and Japanese MNCs was then
computed.
(e) Expectational difference was categorized as:
1. Large, if score from C was in the range of 6-7.
2. Moderate, if score was in the range of 3-5.99.
3. Little or none, if score was in the range of 0-2.99.
Similar categories, as above, were employed to evaluate MNC-
expectations toward the host government.
-
Dependent Variable: Conflict
The dependent variable—conflict—was categorized into four types on the
basis of the following descriptions:
(a) Value Conflicts
These are conflicts that relate to the basic belief and value
systems of a given society. The elements involved in such a conflict
go far beyond the actual issues that trigger off the conflict. For
instance, a U.S. multinational could perceive wage and price controls
legislated by a host government as striking at the very roots of
the ideology of free enterprise. Subsequent debate would then
rest on the right to free enterprise versus the right to impose
controls and not on the piece of legislation enacted per se.
Intensity and emotionality are very high and generally a large
number of constituents are involved.
(b) Negotiational Conflicts
These conflicts have their locus in perceptions of either the
host government or the MNC that some basic terms of the contract
of business have been violated. Such perceived violations are not
necessarily restricted to written contractual obligations but also
extend to implicit obligations and other violations of the 'spirit
of the agreement'. Examples of such conflicts include those that
arise out of the host government's claims that the MNC, at the time
of entry, said it would help create a pool of skilled workers
through company-sponsored vocational schools, but was now indulging
in weaning away skilled personnel from local industries through
promises of better pay. Such conflicts, in our analytical notion,
are restricted to those that take place on a one-to-one basis , i.e.,
a specific company involved in a dispute with the host government's
representatives around some issues . Intensity and emotionality
are fairly high, though less than for value conflicts. The number
of constituents involved are similarly less than those for value
conflicts.
(c) Policy Conflict
These conflicts have their locus in policies laid out by host
governments and the MNCs' disagreement on the issues involved. An
example of :;uch a conflict would be extremely reluctant compliance
by multinational drug companies to, say, a drug price-control
legislation enacted by the host governments. In contrast to
negotiational-level conflicts which take place on a one-to-one
basis, most policy-level conflicts arise out of issues that are
non-company specific, but industry-specific. However, as indicated
earlier, the price-control issue, if carried to its extreme, could
become a value-level issue. Policy-level conflicts are of moderate
intensity and emotionality, with a small number of constituents involved.
(d) Operational Conflict
These conflicts have their locus in differences between the MNCs
and other units or organizations/persons with which they deal.
Such groups include labor unions, stockholders, consumer rights'
groups, etc. Examples of such conflicts would be strikes by
employees, boycott of company product by consumer groups, etc.
Such conflicts are of low intensity and emotionality and the number
of constituents involved is very small.
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TABLE 3
INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF MNCs (SUBSIDIARY)
AND THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
Company
Attributes
(N = 100)
Nature of Conflict Level of
Signifi-
canceNegotiational Policy Operational
Equity holding
%
36
%
36
%
28
p < .08
wholly owned
majority owned 38 27 35
minority owned 20 60 20
Market Share
more than 60% 40 35 25
p < .4704
26-59% 33 42 25
less than 26% 35 27 38
Degree of Com-
petitiveness
seller's market 70 30
p < .05
moderately
competitive 46 37 17
highly
competitive 25 36 39
Expectational
Difference
(between MNCs and
host governments)
large difference 54 28 18
p < .003
moderate difference 27 59 14
little or no
difference 21 28 51
Number of
Employees
more than 1000 40 31 29
p < .0421
999 to 400 40 40 20
399 to 100 19 50 31
less than 100 17 83
Size of Investment
$4.9-$3 Million 43 31 26
p < .5315
$2.9-$2 Million 33 42 25
$1.9-$. 5 Million 20 40 40
less than
$500,000 60 40
Table 3 (continued)
Company
Attributes
(N = 100)
Nature of Conflict Level of
Signifi-
canceNegotiational Policy Operational
Period of
Operation
more than 15 years
%
39
%
35
%
26
p < .4356
6 to 14 years 39 35 26
less than 6 years 50 50
Degree of Diversi
fication
high—more than
5 products 43 33 24
p < .3349
intermediate
—
2 to 5 products 24 36 40
low—less than
2 products 24 40 36
Level of Technology
advanced technology 40 37 23
p < .4135
intermediate
technology 35 31 34
low technology 20 33 47
Type of Industry
extractive ind.
(petroleum & mining) 70 20 10
p < .10
chemical &
pharmaceutical 36 29 35
auto, rubber tires,
consumer durables 35 38 27
consumer nondurable
(soaps, foods) 11 50 39
TABLE 4
MNCs' Executives-Perceptions of Host-Governir.ent Expectations
Percentage of Executives
Host-Government Expectations Who Perceived Expectations
to be Strong
1. Not displace local investors 21
2. Develop local resources 41
3. Use local supplies 28
4. Increase local ownership 24
5. Create positive balance of payments 25
6. Introduce new R&D efforts 24
7. Place more nationals in executive positions 43
8. Provide useful technology 52
9. Increase employment 43
10. Not disturb socio-cultural values 20
11. Create lower prices . 28
12. Increase worker participation in decision-making 9 '•
13. Increase quality of goods 55
14. Increase competition 31
15. Increase economic stability 27
16. Increase variety of consumer goods . 34
17. Stimulate desire for economic growth 33
18. Increase variety of services 40
19. Expand awareness of employment opportunities 15
20. Provide skilled manpower 29
21. Provide raw materials from outside , 43
22. Upgrade wages " 21
23. Provide capital inflow 47
TABLE 5
Mean Intensity of Host-Government Expectations
Host-Government Expectations Mean Intensity
1. Not displace local investors 1.07
2. Develop local resources 1.11
3. Use local supplies 1.13
4. Increase local ownership 1.17
5. Create positive balance of payments 1.67
6. Introduce new R&D efforts 1.67
7. Place more nationals in executive positions 1.83
8. Provide useful technology 2.06
9. Increase employment 2.17
10. Not disturb socio-cultural values 2.17
11. Create lower prices 2.33
12. Increase worker participation in decision-Daking 2.83
13. Increase quality of goods 3.11
14. Increase competition 3.13
15. Increase economic stability 3.17
16. Increase variety of consumer goods 3.17
17. Stimulate desire for economic growth 3.33
18. Increase variety of services 3.60
19. Expand awareness of employment opportunities 3.83
20. Provide skilled manpower 4.83
21. Provide raw materials from outside 5.01
22. Upgrade wages 5.09
23. Provide capital inflow •-. 5.17
v. strong minimal
TABLE 6
Multinationals' Executives-Expectations of Host-Country Governments
Expectations
Percentage of MNCs ' Executives
Whose Expectations Were
Very Strong
1. Provide infrastructure
2. Reduce bureaucratic controls
3. Not interfere with corporate affairs
4. Provide favorable labor legislation
5. Provide favorable business-government relationships
6. Provide more flexible expansion policies
7. Government not to exercise a high degree of control
8. Government not to insist on equity dilution
9. Government to to apply price controls
10. Governments to spell out clearly the terms and
conditions for entry of foreign investors
55
72
73
50
72
62
49
57
44
68
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